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State v. Woods: Interspousal Burglary in Louisiana-Too
Many Doors Left Open?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant, charged with aggravated burglary of the apartment where
his estranged wife and three sons resided, was convicted of simple burglary.
He entered the apartment at about 4:30 a.m., climbed the stairs to the
wife's bedroom, and kicked in the door. Inside were the wife and a male
companion, both of whom testified that defendant entered bearing knives
and making threats. Defendant argued his entry was authorized because
he had a right to enter the community apartment and because his son
had given him a key to the apartment. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and held the husband's entry
of the apartment was unauthorized because it was not a community
dwelling, and the husband, therefore, had no proprietary interest in it.'
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Burglary Legislation

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:62 defines simple burglary as "the
unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit a felony or any
theft therein. ... ."
Burglary, at common law, was viewed as an offense against the
security of habitation. Intrusions into the habitation were thought to
create situations especially dangerous to occupants of the habitation. Thus,
burglary laws developed out of a desire to prevent danger to human life.3
The reporter's comments to Louisiana's aggravated burglary article indicate
that the Louisiana provisions are based on this same rationale. The
explanation for including buildings, vessels, and movables as well as

Copyright 1990, by LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. State v. Woods, 526 So. 2d 443 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
2. La. R.S. 14:62 (1990).
3. C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 326, at 186-88 (14th ed. 1980).
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dwellings within the scope of the crime is that "there may also be great
4
danger to human life in the burglarizing" of these types of things.
Louisiana jurisprudence also recognizes that human safety is the primary concern behind burglary provisions. In State v. Lozier5 the Louisiana
Supreme Court faced the question of whether entry by misrepresentation
constituted an "unauthorized" entry. Before reaching the conclusion that
defendant's entry by impersonating a policeman was "unauthorized," the
court in dictum stated that "[b]urglary laws are not designed primarily
to protect the inhabitant from unlawful trespass and/or the intended
crime, but to forestall the germination of a situation dangerous to the
personal safety of the occupants." 6 Justice Calogero, writing for the Lozier
court, emphasized the paramount role that the "unauthorized" element
of burglary plays in guarding against danger to human safety: "[a] violent
scenario is far less likely to unfold" where the intruder, although possessing
the required felonious intent, "is known to the occupant and has expressed
or implied consent to be on the premises." ' 7 The court reasoned that such

4. La. R.S. 14:60 reporter's comment (1990). Simple burglary is a lesser included
offense of aggravated burglary. Thus, where their elements correspond, the considerations
behind them are usually also identical. However, in State v. Pierre, 320 So. 2d 185 (La.
1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court found that while Louisiana's definition of aggravated
burglary (the unauthorized entering of "any inhabited dwelling or of any structure . ..
where a person is present") falls to some extent within the historical and common law
concept of burglary as a law designed for the protection of the habitation, the protection
that the simple burglary statute provides is much broader.
In Pierre, the defendant was convicted of simple burglary for taking the battery out
of an automobile. Facing the issue of whether simple burglary required that the entry be
into a part of the vehicle where a person could be found, the court stated:
It was, then, clearly the purpose of the legislature to define simple
burglary to incluce unauthorized entries with intent to commit a theft
"other than as set out in Article 60
It was undoubtedly the deliberate purpose of the legislature in enacting
Article 62 to broaden the definition . . . to include lesser offenses where
the felonious entry did not involve entry into an "inhabited" enclosure
or one "where a person is present."
We think it is clear, therefore, that the historical background which
resulted in the common-law definition of burglary is inappropriate to the
interpretation of Article 62. Article 62 does not require that the entry
be into a part of the vehicle capable of or designed to accommodate a
person.
Pierre, 320 So. 2d at 187-88.
Nevertheless, it appears that this language in Pierre is limited to situations in which
the burglary involves a place where a person could not be found-a place outside the
historic coverage of burglary law. In cases where the situation falls within the historic
coverage of burglary law, however, presumably the traditional concerns behind burglary
provisions apply equally to both Louisiana aggravated and simple burglary provisions.
5. 375 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1979).
6. Id. at 1337.
7. Id.
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an entry does not in itself provoke a defensive reaction from the occupant
or owner, thus creating a potentially violent situation. The court stated
that, likewise, in a situation where the victim actually discovers the intended crime, the discovery is less likely to precipitate violence where the
entry was not "unauthorized." '
The Model Penal Code provides that a person is guilty of burglary
"if he enters a building or occupied structure ... with [the] purpose to

commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the
public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter." 9 While some
jurisdictions track the emphasized language of the Model Penal Code
almost exactly in their burglary provisions, others retain the traditional
common law requirement that the place entered be that "of another."
Still other jurisdictions require that the entry be "unlawful" or made
"without consent." Burglary provisions similar or identical to the Model
Penal Code, as well as provisions employing "of another," "unlawful,"
"without consent," or similar language, serve the same practical function
as Louisiana's requirement that the entry be "unauthorized." Thus, cases
interpreting statutes of other jurisdictions often prove helpful in filling
gaps in Louisiana jurisprudence.
B. JurisprudentialInterpretation of the "Unauthorized" Entry
Requirement
1. "Unauthorized" Entry as a Distinct Element
Louisiana's jurisprudence has diverged from some jurisdictions'0 by
determining that Louisiana's "unauthorized" requirement is an element
separate and distinct from the intent requirement. According to the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Dunn" and State v. Lockhart:2
[Tihe entry must be unauthorized and this must be determined
as a distinct element of the offense separate and apart from the
intent to steal. If the legislature desired that burglary consist of
only an entry with intent to steal, they would have omitted the
word unauthorized.3

8. Id.
9. Model Penal Code § 221.1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
10. Those that hold that ill-intent alone is enough to make an entry unauthorized.
See e.g., People v. Gauze, 15 Cal.3d 709, 542 P.2d 1365, 125 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1975).
11. 263 La. 58, 267 So. 2d 193 (1972).
12. 438 So. 2d 1089 (La. 1983).
13. Id. at 1090 (quoting Dunn, 263 La. at 63, 267 So. 2d at 195).
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Emphasis on Occupancy or Possession

Because of the common law requirement that the premises invaded
be those "of another," the "owner" could not be found guilty of
burglary.' 4 However, occupancy or possession, and not title, controlled
the question of whether the premises were those "of another," because
it was the right of habitation rather than the ownership of the property
that was being protected. 5
This historical emphasis on occupancy or possession continues to
16
prevail in interpretations of modern burglary statutes. In State v. Harold,
for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court faced the question of
whether a defendant's alleged ownership interest in the house where his
victim resided prevented the house from being considered that "of another" as to the defendant. The court held that the defendant's ownership
interest in the house was not controlling and stated that defendant's
emphasis on ownership was misplaced, the reason for prohibiting burglary
being "to protect the habitation ... from meditated harm.' 7 The court
further provided that occupation or possession of a dwelling is equivalent
to ownership in burglary cases and that actual ownership need not be
proved. Likewise, in Adirim v. State, 8 holding that naming the person
responsible for custody of the property as owner in the bill of information
rather than the actual owner did not constitute reversible error, a Florida
district court of appeal stated that "[bjurglary is not a disturbance to
the fee of the place as realty, but to the habitable security. Therefore,
in burglary, ownership means any possession which is rightful as against
the burglar.' 9
Innumerable courts, including the Louisiana Supreme Court in State
v. Simmons," have stated that the test for determining in whom ownership
of the premises should be laid is not title, but occupancy or possession
at the time of the offense. In Simmons, the court held that the bill of
information was not fatally defective even though the individual designated
as owner of the building was the tenant of the room broken into rather
than owner of the building. Other courts, while still de-emphasizing actual
ownership, phrase the test for ownership in terms of "control" or "management." In Gilbreath v. State' for example, a Texas court of criminal
appeals stated that in burglary cases the law deems the person having

14.

W. Lafave and A. Scott, Criminal Law, § 8.13(c), at 797 (2d ed. 1986).

15.

Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

312 N.C. 787, 791-92, 325 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1985).
Id.at 791.
350 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
Id.at 1084.
249 La. 647, 190 So. 2d 83 (1966).
158 Tex. Crim. 616, 259 S.W.2d 223 (Crim. App. 1953).
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the "care, control, and management" of the premises at the time of the
offense to be the owner and that ownership may be alleged in that person.
Although, traditionally, the emphasis on occupancy or possession has
arisen primarily in either lessee-as-victim or employee-as-victim contexts,
recent extensions of this same rationale to a marital context have resulted
in the courts holding that an estranged spouse can commit burglary of
a dwelling in which he has an ownership interest, and in some cases,
even of the family home in which he no longer lives."
In Parham v. State,'3 a husband who had been convicted by a jury
of burglarizing the dwelling that he had once shared with his wife contended that under Maryland family law, the dwelling should have been
considered marital property because it was acquired during the marriage.
Thus, he contended that he could not be convicted of burglary because
the dwelling was his own, and not that "of another."2 The court rejected
his contentions, stating that the law of burglary was "designed for the
purpose of protecting the habitation ... and thus, occupancy or possession, rather than ownership, is the test."' Concluding that a rational
trier of fact could have found that the husband had neither a possessory
interest in the dwelling nor a right to be there at the time of entry, the
26
court sustained the husband's conviction.
Again, in State v. Schneider, 7 the defendant spouse focused on actual
ownership of the premises. The wife in Schneider contended that under
Washington community property law, in order to prove that she entered
"unlawfully," the State had to prove that her husband owned the house
and that she did not, thus rebutting "the strong presumption that the
ihouse was community property."' ' The Washington appeals court responded, stating that Mrs. Schneider's contentions misconstrued the nature
of burglary. Because the purpose of burglary law is to protect the dweller,
occupancy rather than ownership controls.2 The Schneidercourt ultimately
affirmed Mrs. Schneider's burglary conviction."
In some decisions, either the statutory embodiment of the emphasis
on occupancy or possession or the previous grant of some form of
injunctive relief to one of the spouses has facilitated the court's decision

22. W. Lafave and A. Scott, Criminal Law, § 8.13(c), at 797 n.61 (2d ed. 1986).
23. 79 Md. App 152, 556 A.2d 280 (Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
24. Id. at 161 n.2, 556 A.2d at 284 n.2.
25. Id. at 161, 556 A.2d at 284.
265 Id. at 163, 556 A.2d at 285 (The court noted that its holding was consistent with
Maryland theft law, which provided that it is a defense to theft that the property involved
was that of defendant's spouse, unless defendant and defendant's spouse were not living
together as man and wife and were living in separate abodes at the time of the theft.)
27. 36 Wash. App. 237, 673 P.2d 200 (Ct. App. 1983).
28. Id. at 240, 673 P.2d at 203.
29. Id.at 241, 673 P.2d at 203.
30. Id.at 244, 673 P.2d at 205.
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as to whether an entry was of a prohibited nature. Under the Texas
statutory scheme, "owner" is defined as one who has "title to the
property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater
right to possession of the property than the actor," as noted by the Texas
court in Ex Parte Davis.3 The wife in Davis had been granted the exclusive
right of possession of the residence by court order and the defendant
husband had been ordered to stay away. The court found that the
husband's entry was without the effective consent of the "owner," even
though title to the residence was held by the defendant husband and his
brother. In applying the Texas statutory provision to the facts before it,
the court stated that the injunction did even more than give the wife a
"greater right to possession"; it gave her exclusive possession of the
32
residence and negated all rights to enter held by the husband.
Although the existence of the injunctive relief in Davis certainly made
the court's decision more clear-cut, failure to secure such relief even
though it is available or failure to notify defendant as to its imposition
will not necessarily be dispositive in a burglary case. In Stanley v. State,3"
the Texas court of criminal appeals again dealt with a- husband who was
charged with burglary of his wife's home. Husband and wife separated,
and the wife obtained a temporary injunction which, among other things,
prohibited her husband from interfering with her use and possession of
the home they had previously shared. Apparently, however, no notice of
the injunction was served on the husband.3 The wife subsequently moved
to a different residence, which her husband broke into. Defendant cited
the Davis court's emphasis on the fact that the injunction had given the
wife a greater right to possession. He argued that because he had not
been notified of the temporary injunction and because of the marital
relationship, he was entitled to enter."

31.

542 S.W.2d 192 ('rex. Crim. App. 1976).

32. Id. at 196. See also Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985)
(defendant was not entitled to directed verdict on burglary charge on ground that house

he allegedly burglarized was first rented as abode for him and his estranged wife, that
he had occupied it with her during their marriage, and that he therefore had legal right
to be on premises, where house in question was owned by brother of estranged wife,
who was murder victim, and rented to wife to be used as marital abode when parties
were not separated, and defendant was under court order to stay away from premises);
State v. Kilponen, 47 Wash. App. 912, 737 P.2d 1024 (Ct. App. 1987) (defendant could
not change court's order that defendant not approach or communicate with his wife
directly or indirectly or go to family residence for any purpose unless accompanied by
deputy sheriff, so that interlineation in acknowledgment of defendant's understanding of
order stating that defendant agreed to conditions until arraignment on specific date was
without effect and order had not expired when defendant entered wife's home, for purpose
of establishing unlawful entry element of burglary).
33. 631 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
34. Id. at 752.
35. Id. at 753.
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The court rejected defendant's claim that the marital relationship
authorized him to enter, without considering the "effect of the temporary
injunction, of which appellant had not been notified." 36 In determining
that the wife clearly had the greater right to possession and was an
"owner" under the Texas statute, the court focused on the fact that the
couple in question had separated, the wife had filed for divorce, had
moved from the home where she had formerly resided with her husband,
and had established another home for herself and her son. Based on
these circumstances, the court concluded, "[s]he had the right to refuse
to consent. There was no implied consent to break and enter merely
because of the marital status. 3 7 Thus, although injunctive relief had been
obtained by the wife, the court decided the case on other grounds, showing
that failure to obtain such relief when it is available may not be fatal
to the burglary charge.
In State v. Herrin,3" the defendant husband admitted that his entry
constituted a possible violation of a court order restricting him from the
property but contended that, because he and his wife were equal owners
of the house, he could not be a burglar with respect to that house. The
court lboked to Ohio trespass law and found it significant that in that
state a person can trespass and therefore commit burglary against property
of which he is legal owner.39 The Ohio trespass statute provided that
"land or premises of another" included any place "belonging to, controlled by, or in the custody of another." 40 The court ultimately found
that the house was in the custody of and controlled by defendant's wife,
not by defendant who was living elsewhere at the time.4 Thus, when
defendant entered without wife's permission, he "trespassed" and, because
42
the other elements were also present, committed burglary.
3.

Consent

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Lozier explained the nature of
consent as a traditional defense against burglary. In Lozier, defendant
was charged with two counts of aggravated burglary. In addition to the
entry by misrepresentation charge presented earlier in this note, defendant
was also charged with having entered another apartment after an accomplice locked the occupant in his bathroom, then admitted the defendant.

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 6 Ohio App. 3d 68, 453 N.E.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1982).
39. The Ohio burglary statute provided: "No person, by force, stealth, or deception,
shall trespass in an occupied structure ... with purpose to commit therein any theft
offense ... or any felony." Id. at 69, 453 N.E.2d at 1106.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The court found that the accomplice, whom the occupant had never met
before but invited inside, did not have the right to authorize defendant's
entry; nor, the court found, was defendant's entry authorized, when he
misrepresented himself as a police officer and entered with the apparent
consent of occupant, that consent being based solely on the understanding
that defendant was a police officer .4 3 Before reaching its conclusions,
however, the court explained the general requirements for valid consent.
Focusing specifically on the case of a private dwelling, the court provided
that in order to constitute a defense to an "unauthorized" entry, the
consent given must be that of an occupant or an occupant's agent.
Furthermore, it must be given by one who possesses both the authority
and the capacity to consent. Finally, in dictum, the court stressed,
The consent must be voluntary and intelligent, that is, based on
a reasonable understanding of the identity and purpose of the
intruder.... Obviously, a child who admits a total stranger would
not necessarily have sufficient understanding of the circumstances
of the entry to give valid consent to an entry.4
Applying the principles laid out in Lozier to a situation where the
victim's ten-year-old daughter let the defendant enter the house, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal stated in State v. Tuggle:4 "Even
assuming that the defendant entered the house with the daughter's consent,
a ten-year-old girl lacked the authority and capacity to give such consent."
The Texas court in Davis, in which the defendant contended that a twelveyear-old girl allowed him to enter the house, likewise stated that "[e]ven
if she voluntarily admitted appellant, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that such act by the twelve-year-old girl was effective consent .... 46
In situations where a minor son or daughter intentionally allows a
defendant entry into his or her parents' home in order that the defendant
may steal, some courts have stressed the unlawful nature of the purpose
in holding that minors have no such authority to consent. For instance,
in People v. Martin,47 while recognizing that a minor living in a house
rented and controlled by his father "may have the ability to authorize
entries into his parents' house for lawful purposes," 4 the court held that
he may not authorize the defendant's entry into the house for "the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

State v. Lozier, 375 So. 2d 1333, 1337 (La. 1979).
Id. at 1336.
504 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
Ex Parte Davis, 542 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
115 I1. App. 3d 103, 106, 449 N.E.2d 1039, 1041 (Ct. App. 1983).
Id.
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unlawful purpose of stealing his parents' jewelry." 49 The distinction recognized in these cases between consent for a lawful purpose and consent
for an unlawful purpose in determining whether the entry was authorized,
however, would probably be invalid in Louisiana. In light of decisions
like Dunn and Lockhart, which state that an entry is not unauthorized
simply because the defendant intends to commit a felony or theft therein
(the intent and the unauthorized entry constituting distinct elements under
the Louisiana statutory scheme), the rationale of Martin would probably
be rejected by Louisiana courts.
C.

Guidance From Other Areas of Law
1.

Interspousal Theft

Because at common law husband and wife were considered one person,
neither husband nor wife could be guilty of larceny for taking the other's
property.50 With the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts,
which treat women as individuals independent of their husbands in property matters, and other statutes, this complete interspousal immunity no
longer stands in most states." Indeed, as early as 1910, although the
marriage in question was doubtful, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State
v. Hogg12 held that a "husband" could be guilty of embezzling his
"wife's" property."
The Model Penal Code contains a specific provision regarding interspousal theft which abolishes interspousal immunity except in certain
narrowly defined circumstances:
(4) Theft From Spouse. It is no defense that theft was from the
actor's spouse, except that misappropriation of household and
personal effects, or other property normally accessible to both
spouses, is theft only if it occurs after the parties have ceased
living together.14

49. Id. See also K.P.M. v. State, 446 So. 2d 723 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984) (where son
of owners of home invited defendant to enter home and steal items, invitation did not
provide defendant with affirmative defense of consent to charge of burglary, since consent
of son was unauthorized and inoperative, and defendant could not reasonably, and in
good faith, have believed" that the son had the authority to permit him to enter residence
for purpose of stealing).
50. C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 393, at 390 (14th ed. 1980).
51. Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.1 comment 5 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
52. 126 La. 1053, 53 So. 225 (1910).
53. The court reserved the question of whether a wife could be guilty of embezzling
her husband's property.
54. Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.1(4) (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
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Thus, the availability of this "household and personal effects" defense

hinges on whether the parties still live together.
2. InterspousalRape
The Louisiana legislature has specifically addressed the possibility of

rape between persons still legally married and has determined that, except
in the case of simple rape, the fact that the person charged with the
rape was still legally married to the victim at the time of the act warrants
no exceptional treatment under the law. In the 1990 session, the Louisiana
legislature amended Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:41, which defined rape
as "the act of ... sexual intercourse with [someone] who is not the
spouse of the offender, committed without ... lawful consent. ' " 5 The
article further provided that a person is not considered a "spouse" if

either: (1) a judgment of separation has been rendered; or (2) if the
spouses are not legally separated but are living separate and apart, and

the offender knows that a temporary restraining order, preliminary or
permanent injunction, or other order has been issued prohibiting the
offender from sexually or physically abusing,- intimidating, threatening
violence against, or in any way physically interfering with the other

spouse. 16 Under the new law, it is irrelevant that the spouses are still
legally married for most rape crimes. In the case of simple rape5 7 however,

55. La. R.S. 14:41(A) (amended 1990).
56. Id. 14:41(C) (repealed 1990).
57. La. R.S. 14:43 provides:
A. Simple rape is a rape committed where the anal or vaginal sexual
intercourse is deemed without the lawful consent of the victim who is
not the spouse of the offender because it is committed under any one
or more of the following circumstances:
(1) Where the victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding the
nature of the act by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of the
mind produced by an intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent, administered by or with the privity of the offender; or when the victim
has such incapacity, by reason of a stupor or abnormal condition of
mind from any cause, and the offender knew or should have known
of the victim's incapacity; or
(2) Where the victim is incapable, 'through unsoundness of mind,
whether temporary or permanent, of understanding the nature of the
act; and the offender knew or should have known of the victim's
incapacity; or
(3) Where the female victim submits under the belief that the person
committing the act is her husband and such belief is intentionally
inducedby any artifice, pretence, or concealment practiced by the
offende.
B. For purposes of this Section, a person shall not be considered to
be a spouse if a judgment of separation from bed and board has been
rendered, or if the person and the offender are not legally separated but
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the possibility of a husband or wife being found guilty of interspousal
rape still depends upon whether some form of available judicial relief
has been obtained by the alleged victim, and in the absence of a legal
separation, also upon whether tie couple no longer lives together.
III.

A.

ANALYSIS

Structure of the Court's Analysis

The Woods court framed the issues in the case as: (1) whether the
apartment was a community dwelling; 5" and (2) if so, whether Woods'
entry into the apartment could be considered unauthorized. After answering the community dwelling inquiry in the negative, the court stated
that the entry was unauthorized. The court did not expressly address the
second question.
The court's overall approach to the "unauthorized" inquiry appears
to have been as follows: to determine whether the dwelling is a community
one, the court looks to the classification of the rent obligation under the
Louisiana Civil Code's matrimonial regimes articles. If the rent obligation
is a separate obligation, then the husband has no proprietary interest in
the dwelling. If, however, it is a community obligation, he does have a
proprietary interest.
Thus, the initial question asked by the Woods court, on a more basic
level, is whether the defendant has any proprietary interest in the premises.
If not, then the defendant's entry is unauthorized, and the inquiry ends
here with the same outcome as Woods. If, however, defendant does have
a proprietary interest in the premises, then apparently the Woods court
would say that the entry is not unauthorized. 9 Such a theoretical frame-

are living separate and apart and the offender knows that a temporary
restraining order, preliminary or permanent injunction, or other order or
decree has been issued prohibiting or restraining the offender from sexually
or physically abusing, intimidating, threatening violence against, or in any
way physically interfering with the person.
C. Whoever commits the crime of simple rape shall be imprisoned,
with or without hard labor, for not more than twenty-five years.
58. Apparently, what the court means by "community dwelling" is whether the
dwelling may be considered "of the community" or "community property."
59. This conclusion may be reached by considering the implications of the court's

statement: "Therefore, the appellant does not have any proprietary interest in the apart-,
ment, and as such, his entry could be deemed to have been an unauthorized entry."
(emphasis added). State v. Woods, 526 So. 2d 443, 445 (1988). This statement suggests
that where the defendant does have proprietary interest in the premises, then his entry
could not be deemed unauthorized.
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work, where proprietary interest is apparently determinative of whether
an entry is unauthorized, is virtually impossible to reconcile with burglary
policy and jurisprudence. As illustrated by the doctrine and jurisprudence
reported in this note, the focus of burglary law has been primarily on
protection of occupancy or possession of property, and not on protection
of ownership. To embrace the Woods rationale entirely would lead to
the absurd conclusion that a lessor may not be convicted of burglarizing
his lessee's home. This is clearly not the law.
As a practical matter, the Woods court did consider the occupancy
or possession of the premises in its determination that the rent obligation
was not a community obligation. The court stated that the rental of the
apartment for the sole use of Mrs. Woods and her children did not meet
the criteria of a community obligation, "especially where ...[Mr.] Woods
did not also live there."60 However, the court's failure to include occupancy
or possession as a consideration in its overall analysis, and its emphasis
on proprietary interest instead, certainly cast doubt on the soundness of
the theory behind the decision-especially because the court is wrong in
its analysis of the community right involved as well.
Also questionable about the Woods approach is its failure to address
consent as a possible defense, the court basically "punting" the issue.
As stated in Lozier, consent is a traditional defense against burglary, but
to be valid, it must conform to certain requirements: the consent given
must be that of an occupant or an occupant's agent; it must be given
by one with the authority and capacity to consent; and it must be voluntary
and intelligent.
Applying these requirements to the facts in Woods, in which George
Woods and his son who lived in the apartment both gave uncontroverted
testimony that the son had provided Woods with a key to the apartment,
it appears that Woods had the consent of an "occupant." Mrs. Woods,
however, testified that she had changed the locks to the apartment three
times to prevent Mr. Woods from entering the apartment with the keys
given to him by the sons. Thus, the questions of whether the son had
the authority and capacity to consent, and whether the consent was
voluntary and intelligent remain.
After stating that "voluntary and intelligent" consent requires that
the consent be based on a reasonable understanding of the identity and
purpose of the intruder, the Lozier court stated that a child who allows
a total stranger to enter would not necessarily have sufficient understanding
of the circumstances to give valid consent. Woods is certainly distinguishable from such a scenario in that the child in Woods knew the
identity of George Woods, his father. In addition, Woods testified that
he had explained to his sons that he was interested in reconciling with

60.

Woods, 526 So. 2d at 445.
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his wife. Furthermore, Woods stated that the sons shared this interest
and appeared to suggest that this was part of the son's motivation in
giving his father the key. Is this enough to say that the son's gving the
key to his father was based on a reasonable understanding of the father's
purpose?
Finally, addressing the authority and capacity requirement, the first
circuit in Tuggle stated that a ten-year-old girl lacks the authority and
capacity to consent. The Woods record does not provide the age of the
son who gave Mr. Woods the key. Based on the clarity of his testimony
at trial and on the fact that he was given his own key to the apartment
to let himself in after school, the child probably was not of tender years.
But even if the son were found to be of a sufficient age to give effective
consent, what effect if any should his mother's changing the locks have
on his authority to tonsent? The question of consent appears to have
been at least worthy~of the court's consideration.
B.

Classification of Rent Obligation

Again questionable, but perhaps flowing from an attempt by the court
to achieve an equitable result within the context of its faulty overall
analytical framework, is the court's classification of the rent obligation
as a separate one. Although the classification of the obligation would be
irrelevant if the court had properly focused on occupancy or possession
rather than on proprietary interest in its overall burglary analysis, this
portion of the opinion is being addressed only to point out its potentially
dangerous implications for matrimonial regimes law.
First, the court not only ignored the presumption of Civil Code Article
2361 that any obligation incurred during the existence of the community
property regime is,-presumed to be a community obligation, but entirely
reversed it. The court said, "it does not appear that the rental ... of
the apartment . . ' would meet the criteria of a community obligation
....
As such, Ms. Woods' rent obligation would be her separate obligation, not an obligation of the community .... ,,61 Thus, the court
appeared to place the burden of proof on the party in whose favor the
presumption normally applies, and not on the party asserting that the
obligation was a separate one, who normally bears the burden of rebuttal.
It appears that the obligation ultimately should have been classified
as a community obligation. Applying the presumption of Article 2361,
unless the rent obligatioidmeets the criteria of a separate obligation under
Article 2363, it is a community obligation. Article 2363 provides, in
relevant part, that a separate obligation is one incurred "during the
existence of a community property regime though not for the common

61.

Id.
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interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse.''62 One
can hardly say that an obligation incurred by a wife for the purpose of
providing shelter for her and her husband's children would be one "not
for the common interest of the spouses" or one not "for the interest of
the [husband]."

IV.

QUESTIONS LEFT OPEN BY THE

Woods

COURT

After Woods, many questions remain unanswered regarding interspousal burglary in Louisiana. Among the issues that the court failed to
address are: (1) the relevant policy considerations in the area of interspousal crimes; and (2) the role that should be assigned to the various
forms of relief available to the spouses.
Any discussion of interspousal crimes would be incomplete without
d presentation of certain basic policy concerns. Various theories of legislation have been advanced by different jurisdictions in the areas of
interspousal and interfamily theft law, 63 some of which are equally relevant
to interspousal burglary. One such theory is that prosecution in this area
undermines the unity of the family. However, the counter-argument to
this theory is that the theft itself and the desire of one spouse to prosecute
the other evidence the fact that family unity has already been disrupted.
Furthermore, disruption of the family unit is even more evident in interspousal burglary cases in which the spouses have chosen to discontinue
living together.
Another theory is that prosecution of interspousal crimes should be
restricted because of the danger of miscarriage of justice, interspousal
bitterness making testimony especially unreliable. This argument belittles
the effectiveness of our criminal justice system, which is designed to
determine the truth or falsity of accusations." The possibility of false
accusations exists in all areas of criminal law and, even though our system
may fail to screen invalid accusations in some cases, there is no reason
to believe that it will do so to a significantly greater degree in the
interspousal crime area. 65 As stated by commentators addressing similar
concerns in the interspousal rape area, "[i]f potential false charges were
reason not to legislate against certain actions; there wouldn't be a law
on the books."6
A third theory is that family thefts should be excluded from criminal
law because they are so generally tolerated that the actor cannot be

62. La. Civ. Code art. 2363.
63. Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.1 comment 5 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
64. Comment, The Marital Rape Exemption, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 597, 600 (1981).
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Griffin, In 44 States It's Legal to Rape Your Wife, 9 Student Law.
20, 21 (1980)).
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considered as "deviating significantly from social norms." 67 There is some
feeling also that the possibility of some misappropriations by a spouse
is part of the risk assumed by matrimony. These arguments are less
persuasive in the typical interspousal burglary case. In most interspousal
burglary situations, the spouses no longer live together, and each spouse
legitimately expects a certain degree of privacy. Furthermore, the potentially dangerous situation created by the unexpected and unauthorized
invasion by one spouse into the abode of the other is exactly the type
of situation burglary law was designed to guard against and cannot be
justified by the fact that such dangers are often tolerated and go unreported. By analogy, interspousal battery is also often tolerated. Yet interspousal battery is still considered a crime. The same should be true
for interspousal burglary when the spouses no longer live together.
Lastly, there is the belief that family crime complaints are but a
symptom of family quarrels, which criminal courts are unsuited to handle.
Again, the significance of this argument is weakened in the marital
burglary context. The facts that the spouses have resorted to separate
residences and that one spouse desires that the other not enter his or her
dwelling without permission indicate that the problems between the spouses
have escalated beyond a mere "family quarrel" into something so much
more serious that the family unit is in jeopardy. Unauthorized intrusions
under such circumstances create dangerous situations for which criminal
law is indeed the proper remedy and criminal court is the proper forum.
It is also important to explore the possible role of various forms of
relief available to Louisiana spouses who suffer marital difficulties. Louisiana spouses have several remedies available to them including, of course,
filing for separation or divorce. Also available are the remedies of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:306,6 which provides for an injunction to prohibit
a spouse from physically or sexually abusing the petitioning spouse, and
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:308,69 which provides for the use and occupancy of the family home. The protection of each of the latter two
statutes, however, is available only when one of the spouses has filed
for separation or divorce. 70 What should be the role of these possible
forms 'of relief in Louisiana burglary law? Should a spouse be required
to pursue separation or divorce as well as one of these remedies before
Louisiana extends the protection of its burglary provisions? Or is it more
desirable to provide interim protection to spouses for that period after

67. Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.1 comment 5 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
68. La. R.S. 9:306 (1990).
69. La. R.S. 9:308 (1990).
70. Relief under 9:306 is available only after petition for separation or divorce has
been filed, but relief under 9:308 may be filed for in conjunction with the filing for
separation or divorce.
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the spouses have ceased living together but before either has filed for
separation or divorce?
The Louisiana legislature, as presented earlier in this note, has specifically addressed the possibility of interspousal rape and has placed
extreme significance on whether the victim spouse has obtained an available
remedy and whether the spouses live separate and apart in the case of
simple rape, but has chosen to give spouses no special treatment under
the other rape provisions. Although Louisiana has no specific interspousal
theft provision, the Model Penal Code provision places emphasis merely
on whether the parties still live together, and not on whether available
relief has been secured, in determining the availability of the "personal
effects defense." What approach should be chosen for Louisiana burglary
law?
In light of the relevant policy considerations, the historic emphasis
of burglary law on occupancy or possession, and the practical need in
many instances for protection for spouses prior to filing for separation
or divorce, it appears that the most sensible approach to interspousal
burglary would be to look to who actually resides at the premises in
determining whether an entry is authorized. Only the actual occupants
and those authorized to enter by an occupant or an occupant's agent
should be considered authorized under the law. Although filing for legal
separation or divorce and obtaining some form of legal protection would
make it clearer to a spouse that he or she is no longer authorized to
enter the premises where the other spouse resides, problems may arise
prior to filing for legal separation or divorce and obtaining legal protection.
Pursuit of relief, as a practical matter, may often be either delayed or
not attempted at all by spouses; yet problems may occur nevertheless.
When a person has chosen to cease living with his or her spouse, mere
failure to have already taken legal preventive measures should not be
enough to deny that person burglary law protection.
Marjorie Ann McKeithen

